Context: Adolescent sexual activity in the United states is prevalent and occurring increasingly early, particularly among minority groups. Other risk behaviors (e.g., alcohol consumption) often co-occur with sexual behavior. By examining the association of risk and adaptive behaviors with precursors of sexual behavior--specifically, sexual intentions--it may be possible to identify preadolescents who are at increased risk for early sexual initiation.
Methods: Data from 1,090 black fourth and fifth graders and their parents from the Parents Matter! Program were used in logistic regression analyses to assess covariation between preadolescents' risk and adaptive behaviors, and their intentions to initiate sexual intercourse in the next year.
Sexual Intentions (2001)
Results: Risk and adaptive behaviors, as reported by both preadolescents and parents, were associated with sexual intentions; the findings were not qualified by youth's gender. Alcohol consumption and having been in trouble with the police were the primary youth-reported risk behaviors associated with the odds of intending to have intercourse (odds ratios, 2.3 and 1.8); the preadolescent's being in trouble at home was the primary parent-reported risk behavior (2.1). In both sets of reports, performing well on schoolwork was associated with reduced odds of intending to engage in sex (0.5 - 0.6).
Conclusions: Risk and adaptive behaviors are markers of sexual intentions among black preadolescents. Prevention programs can use these behaviors to identify black youth who may be at high risk for early sexual initiation.
This paper examines the relationship between sexual harassment and the job satisfaction and intended turnover of active-duty women in the U.S. military using unique data from a survey of the incidence of unwanted gender-related behavior conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense. Overall, 70.9 percent of active-duty women reported experiencing some type of sexually harassing behavior in the 12 months prior to the survey. Using single-equation probit models, we find that experiencing a sexually harassing behavior is associated with reduced job satisfaction and heightened intentions to leave the military. However, bivariate probit results indicate that failing to control for unobserved personality traits causes single-equation estimates of the effect of the sexually harassing behavior to be overstated. Similarly, including women's views about whether or not they have in fact been sexually harassed directly into the single equation model reduces the estimated effect of the sexually harassing behavior itself on job satisfaction by almost a half while virtually eliminating it for intentions to leave the military. Finally, women who view their experiences as sexual harassment suffer additional negative consequences over and above those associated with the behavior itself.
All manner of movements occur in the world, but only some are counted as the behavior of agents. In turn, only some of this behavior is counted as action. For instance, I might toss and turn in my sleep, and this would normally be reckoned as human behavior, but no one would think to ask me why I rolled over at some particular time or twitched my leg just so. In a sense these are not things that I did. My leg twitched, my body moved, but I really had no say in the matter and so would have no answer to a question about my reason for moving in these ways. I might be able to explain the cause, but I would be in no better a position than anyone else to do so, unless I happen to be some sort of expert on human physiology. Action is not like this: it does make sense to ask someone why they did what they did. In asking such a question we are typically asking about their intention, that is, what did they take themselves to be doing and what was their purpose in doing it. In a sense, then, questions about intention are questions about the meaning of actions. This sets them apart from questions about causes, since I might not know what caused me to sleep so restlessly but I cannot be so ignorant of my intentions. I could hypothesize that dehydration caused me to sleep badly, but if I get up to drink some water then it is no hypothesis on my part that I am heading to the kitchen to get something to drink. Nor is it a prediction about what I expect to happen once I reach the kitchen. It is a statement of fact about what I am doing right now: going to the kitchen to drink some water. Other descriptions of my behavior might be equally true. For instance, that I am putting one foot in front of the other, making the floorboards creak, and so on. But the statement of my intention, of what I take myself to be doing, is likely to be the most illuminating for anyone who wants to understand what I am doing (which is closely related to the question of why I am doing it). If I am failing to achieve my goal it might be even more helpful to know what that goal was, since it will not be so clearly visible as it is in the cases in which I do achieve it.
Another problem with consequentialism is its ignoring of intention, without which we seemingly cannot make sense of human behavior. This means that, while we can indeed pass judgment on actions in a consequentialist way, we cannot consistently live as if consequentialism were true. We cannot, that is, live our whole lives as if intentions do not matter, even though we can pretend that they do not when deciding what to do or expressing approval or disapproval of actions. Consequentialists then are almost inevitably in bad faith. They pretend to believe what they cannot and do not in fact believe.
Contraception is not quite the same as abortion, but it is bad in a related way, she thinks. She distinguishes between two kinds of sexual intercourse: the kind that is intended to be non-procreative and the kind that is not so intended. Any sexual act that never could lead to procreation, such as masturbation, is in the former category, and so is sex using contraception. Sexual acts that could lead to procreation but that will not because at least one partner is naturally infertile fall in the latter category. Acts of the first type are abuses of our generative organs, treating as mere vehicles of pleasure the very means to bring new life into the world. Acts of the second type, on the other hand, are perfectly all right, so long as one does not make a point of only having sex when one knows that pregnancy is impossible, one does not get too addicted to sexual pleasure, and one has sex only within marriage as traditionally defined, so that any children will likely have a father and a mother to take care of them.
In her opinion, gay sex is wrong then in exactly the same way, and for the same reason, that masturbation is wrong. It is a use of the sexual organs that can never lead to procreation, and thus a kind of insult to life itself. Gay marriage is a union founded on an agreement to engage in this kind of activity, and is hence unacceptable.
As for gay marriage, similarly, Anscombe argues that only if a marriage is of the kind that could lead to children being brought into the world (that is, if it is a heterosexual marriage, even if one or both partners is known to be infertile) is its beginning an event worthy of ceremony. And, she implies, if its beginning is not an event worthy of ceremony then it is not a proper marriage. It is hard to see exactly how this kind of view can avoid regarding infertile marriages as somehow belonging to a second class. It is also hard to see how one could ever work out exactly which events are worthy of ceremony (and how much, and of what kind) in the first place. Some critics have argued that if Anscombe is right then this or that bad consequence would follow. The problem appears to be more that nothing at all follows with any clarity from her premises, whether one accepts them or not. This is not to say that Anscombe is wrong to believe that ceremony is in order at a wedding. What it is to say is that the perception that ceremony is in order is not the kind of perception that is readily testable or precisely measurable. In a word it is subjective or, as Anscombe sometimes puts it, mystical. When mystical perception is not universal it is hard to use it as the basis for arguments over controversial subjects.
Section 2423(a) of Title 18 prohibits anyone from transporting any individual under the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution or any criminal sexual activity. It imposes a maximum 15 years' imprisonment and/or a fine under Title 18.
Section 2423(b) prohibits anyone from traveling, or conspiring to do so, in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act, as defined in Section 2246, with a person under 18 that would be a violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The penalty under this section is imprisonment for a maximum of 15 years and/or a fine.
The People charged defendant with eight counts of child molestation, alleging substantial sexual conduct as to one count. (Pen. Code, 288, subd. (a), 1203.066, subd. (a)(8); further section references are to this code.) He pleaded not guilty and asked for deferred entry of judgment, which the [91 Cal. App. 4th 1266] People opposed. The trial court found defendant was eligible for deferral and was a suitable candidate, but that the court had no power to grant the request. Defendant pleaded guilty to one count and no contest to a second count, and admitted substantial sexual conduct. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, granted probation, and issued a certificate of probable cause. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
"(c)(1) In lieu of trial, the prosecuting attorney may make a motion to the trial court to defer entry of judgment with respect to any crime charged in which a minor is a victim of an act of molestation or sexual abuse, provided that the defendant pleads guilty to all crimes and enhancements charged. Upon that motion and defendant's plea of guilty to all charges and enhancements, the court may defer entry of judgment, contingent upon the defendant's referral to, and completion of, a treatment program approved by the [91 Cal. App. 4th 1267] prosecuting attorney. Upon the defendant's successful completion of the treatment program, and upon the positive recommendation of the treatment program authority and the motion of the prosecuting attorney, but no sooner than five years from the date of the defendant's referral to the treatment program, the court shall dismiss the charge or charges against the defendant. 2ff7e9595c
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